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Abstract
Dot-products form the basis of various applications
ranging from scientiﬁc computations to commercial ap-
plications in data mining and transaction processing.
Typical scientiﬁc computations utilizing sparse iterative
solvers use repeated matrix-vector products. These can
be viewedas dot-productsof sparse vectors. Indatabase
applications, dot-products take the form of counting op-
erations. With widespread use of clustered and dis-
tributed platforms, these operations are increasinglybe-
ing performed across networked hosts. Traditional APIs
for messaging are susceptible to snifﬁng, and the data
being transferred between hosts is often enough to com-
promise the entire computation. For example, in a do-
main decomposition based sparse solver, the entire so-
lution can often be reconstructed easily from boundary
values that are communicated on the net. In yet other
applications,dot-productsmay be performed across two
hosts that do not want to disclose their vectors, yet,
they need to compute the dot-product. In each of these
cases, there is a need for secure and anonymous dot-
product protocols. Due to the large computational re-
quirements of underlying applications, it is highly de-
sirable that secure protocols add minimal overhead to
the original algorithm. Finally, by its very nature, dot-
products leak limited amounts of information – one of
the parties can detect an entry of the other party’s vec-
tor by simply probing it with a vector with a 1 in a par-
ticular location and zeros elsewhere. Given all of these
constraints,traditionalcryptographicprotocolsaregen-
erally unsuitable due to their signiﬁcant computational
andcommunicationoverheads. In this paper,we present
an extremely efﬁcientandsufﬁcientlysecure protocolfor
computing the dot-product of two vectors using linear
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algebraic techniques. Using analytical as well as exper-
imental results, we demonstrate superior performance
in terms of computational overhead, numerical stabil-
ity, and security. We show that the overhead of a two-
party dot-product computation using MPI as the mes-
saging API across two high-endworkstations connected
via a Gigabit ethernet approaches multiple 4.69 over an
un-secured dot-product. We also show that the average
relative error in dot-products across a large number of
random (normalized) vectors was roughly
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￿
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1 Introduction and Motivation
With the emergence of clustered and distributed plat-
forms as cost-effective parallel programming environ-
ments, a number of critical computations are routinely
executed over the net. These include scientiﬁc simu-
lations, data mining operations, and commercial trans-
actions. Data transferred over the net in such applica-
tions is highly susceptible to packet snifﬁng, and other
attacks that compromise the privacy and integrity of the
computation. While the problem of packet snifﬁng can
be addressed by secure-tunneling the data (encrypting
all communication), the overhead of secure tunneling
puts tremendous pressure on already scarce communi-
cation throughput. The problem of securing communi-
cated data is much better handled in application level
protocolsas opposedto generalcryptographicprotocols.
In yet other computations, entities participating in a
parallel program may not trust each other. For example,
two competing grocery chains may elect to join forces
in mining their sales data. Yet, neither might want to
reveal precise sales ﬁgures to the other. Most database
operations take the form of calculating the dot-product
of an external with a resident, database vector. Thesevectors are valuable to both parties and leaking informa-
tion has a deﬁnite cost. Nevertheless, the popularity of
data mining forces a compromise between speed and se-
curity. In more malicious environments, two hosts may
choose to execute an untrusted computation protocol to
guard against the possibility that one of the hosts may
have been compromised. In such cases, hosts may agree
to participate in a computation so long as their own data
is not compromised (revealed) to others.
In addition to lack of trust in the network and other
parties, secure and anonymous protocols are subject to
traditional constraints of parallel processing – namely
that a ten-fold speedup from parallelism must not be
cancelled out by a ten-fold slowdown resulting from the
secure protocol. With these objectives in mind, we pro-
pose, in this paper, a secure protocol for a key com-
putational kernel – dot-products. By its very nature, a
dot-product leaks a certain amount of information. If
two parties are trying to compute a secure and anony-
mous dot-product, one of the parties can detect an en-
try of the other party’s vector by simply probing it with
a one in the corresponding location. Due to this, we
expect a higher-level application protocol to disallow a
large number of probes on a single vector. We focus
here on securing a single dot-product using a protocol
that has low computational (and communication) over-
head, good security properties, and excellent numerical
stability.
Consider two parties, Alice and Bob, holding a vec-
tor each and wanting to compute securely their dot-
product. There are two important aspects of this oper-
ation. First, no one eavesdropping the communication
should be able to derive any information on the nature
of the two vectors. Second, the only thing revealed to
either party should be the outcome of the operation. Ex-
isting protocols meeting the above criteria derive their
security from the properties of modular exponentiation
and introduce unacceptable overhead unless perfect se-
curity is absolutely necessary. On the other hand there
is a wide range of environmentsdemandinga fast proto-
col, secure enough to resist a large repertory of attacks
but not necessarily a very powerful, yet unlikely, adver-
sary. For such applications, linear algebraic techniques
provide a powerful set of tools for securing, at the ap-
plication level, the underlying computations. Here, we
present one such protocol that has extremely low over-
head (shown to tend to a factor of 4.69 on average), ex-
cellent numerical stability, and security properties.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion 2 presents three applications of the proposed tech-
nique, Section 3 presents an overview of the protocol
and discusses existing results in the area, Section 4 out-
lines the new dot-product protocol, Section 5 provides
experimental results of overhead and stability, and Sec-
tion 6 draws conclusions and outlines ongoing work.
2 Applications
The proposed protocol has been designed with the
following speciﬁc applications in mind. This list is
merely representative of the rich class of applications to
which the protocol can be applied.
￿ Biometrics and matching. The heart of all data
matching applications is the dot-product. The need
for security is heightened when the data contains
sensitive information. The most notable example is
that of biological or genetic information. The de-
mand for such applications is expected to increase
signiﬁcantly and with it, the need for privacy and
efﬁciency. Anonymity is the main objective but
the amount of information involved nulliﬁes any
computation-intensive attack, even if it looks fea-
sible in theory.
￿ Distributeddatamining. Datamininginvolvesdata
whosecollectionhasa considerablecostandwhose
security is essential. The widespread use of data
mining techniques and their distributed nature de-
mand fast, secure dot-product protocols. Compu-
tation overhead might not be the critical factor in
this case, but the limited bandwidth does not allow
for a large communication overhead. Any protocol
aimed at data mining applications should feature a
small number of rounds and a limited bit count.
￿ Critical scientiﬁc computations. Such computa-
tions usually take place in tightly coupled net-
works. A typical representative kernel of these ap-
plications is an iterative linear system solver. The
core of this solver is the sparse mat-vec operation.
Matricesaretypicallyrowpartitioned(typicallyus-
inga graphpartitionersuchas Metis orChaco)and,
in this form they are simply multiple dot-products.
A deﬁning characteristic of such applications is
thatdata is typicallyreusedoverrepeatedmat-vecs.
A protocol exploiting this characteristic, enjoys a
huge advantage, because it amortizes most of the
overhead over a large number of rounds.
3 Overview of Protocol and Related Re-
sults
The most commonly used technique for hiding a
number is modular multiplication. This is considered
a perfectly secure and efﬁcient operation. Generaliz-
ing to higher dimensionsis what one would ideally want
2for a protocol involving vectors. In the case of the dot-
product,this is not possible due to the incompatibilityof
the operation with modular arithmetic. Furthermore, in
this protocol a vector would have to be multiplied with
a random matrix, which leads to complications. The
protocol we present is based on the above principle. It
leaks a controlled amount of information, however, this
informationleakage is negligible comparedto the inher-
ent leak in the problem. In experiments our protocol
demonstrates ideal numerical stability and an overhead,
compared to the simple dot-product operation, of a fac-
tor of less than 4.7, in the worst case. If the same vector
is reused, subsequent computations can reuse more than
half of the computations and exactly half of the commu-
nication, for an even lower amortized overhead. These
measurements were taken over a Gigabit ethernet and
they reveal that the overhead is dominated by the com-
munication. Overa slower network,such as the Internet,
the above ratio would be even lower.
3.1 Related research
The ﬁrst secure multiparty computation problem was
described in [1]. Since then, research on such problems
has grown signiﬁcantly to form one of the most active
areas of research in computer security. In [2], a gen-
eral framework for any secure multiparty computation
was presented. Although this framework can be applied
to the dot-product problem, yielding an algorithm linear
in the size of the vectors, its extensive use of oblivious
transfer ([5]) makes it impractical because of very high
constants in computation and communication.
There have not been many protocols speciﬁc to the
secure multiparty dot-product computations. In [3, 4],
such protocols are described in the context of larger
constructions. They are based on conventional crypto-
graphic techniques which incur a large overhead since
they rely on the difﬁculty of problems related to modu-
lar exponentiation for their security.
4 The Proposed Dot-Product Protocol
We consider here, a two-party computation where
each party is honest-but curious. In other words, every-
one participating in the protocol abides by the rules but
if they have the opportunity to ﬁnd out something more
than they are supposed to, they will. We also assume
that only one of the parties is interested in the result,
a realistic assumption for the range of applications dot-
products are associated with. Finally, a random number
in the context of real-valued vectors is a uniformly dis-
tributed, random integer cast into real.
Figure1.Proposedprotocolforsecuredot-
products.
A formal statement of the problem is as follows: Al-
ice holds vector
￿ and Bob vector
￿, both in
￿
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿
￿. Alice is interested in computing
￿
￿
￿
￿ with-
out revealing anything about her vector. Bob is willing
to participate in such a protocol as long as he does not
reveal more than the dot-product to Alice.
Let
￿ be a random
￿
￿
￿ matrix,
￿
￿
￿, where
￿ is a
security parameter. Bob chooses a random
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿,
and
￿
￿
￿ random
￿
￿
￿ vectors,
￿
￿
￿
￿
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￿
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￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.
Let
￿
￿be the vector in
￿
￿ for which
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿, for all
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿, and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . He sets
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿and
creates an
￿
￿
￿ matrix
￿, whose
￿-th row is
￿
￿
￿ .W e
deﬁne the following:
￿
￿
￿
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￿
￿
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￿
￿
Bob chooses a random
￿
￿
￿ vector
￿ and three ran-
domnumbers
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿, andmakes the followingpub-
lic:
￿
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￿
￿
￿
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￿
￿
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￿
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￿
￿, where
￿ is a random number. Alice
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and sends it to Alice. The desired dot-product is ﬁnally
given by
￿
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￿. This protocol is illustrated in Figure 1.
4.1 Proof of Correctness
A proofthat what Bob computesis indeedthedesired
dot-product is as follows:
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Therefore,
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￿. This veriﬁes the correctness
of the protocol.
4.2 Analysis of Security
Due to the nature of multiplication and addition,
some information is statistically revealed by the proto-
col. However, since exposing a vector
￿ times in dot-
product calculations will reveal it fully, any such analy-
sis can only have limited success. We analyze here the
information ﬂow between Alice and Bob.
￿ From Bob to Alice
Bob makes three things public:
–
￿
￿
￿. Vector
￿ is involved in this
￿
￿
￿ ma-
trix. However, even if Alice can guess which
row of
￿ is
￿, it is impossible to separate the
two matricesinanywaywithoutfurtherinfor-
mation. Therefore, making this matrix public
conveys no information about
￿ to Alice.
–
￿
￿ . This is the sum of a random vector and a
vector, which could be claimed to leak infor-
mation, althoughit is quite debatable whether
it does. However, unless the random vector is
disclosed,
￿
￿is certainnottoleakinformation.
–
￿. This vector does not reveal information
about the random vector of the previous para-
graph, unless one could guess the
￿
￿’s. So
long as they are random, no information is
leaked.
–
￿
￿
￿. Alice knows that the product is a lin-
ear combination of these two. If she uses a
linearly independent vector
￿
￿
￿w.r.t.
￿,t o
create more equations so that she can deduce
the coefﬁcientsfor
￿ and
￿, she will introduce
a new unknown to the system for each new
equation, namely
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.I f
￿
￿
￿is linearly
dependent w.r.t.
￿ she does not create a new
equation. We, also, note that
￿
￿
￿ if and
only if
￿
￿
￿ . Therefore, she cannot deduce
any information about
￿.
Sending
￿ to Bob, Alice reveals an equation
about her vector. This way, both parties come
out of the protocol with the same number of
equations. To keep this equation secret from
an eavesdropper, Alice and Bob must share
a secret random number or use standard en-
cryption to communicate it. Since this is only
a scalar, the overhead is insigniﬁcant.
￿ From Alice to Bob.
Alice sends two things to Bob, after step 1.
4–
￿. This vector cannot reveal anything to Bob,
unless he can separate
￿ from
￿
￿
￿
￿.
–
￿. This gives to Bob an equation about
￿
￿ . Computing the dot-product gives another
equation. He cannot combine
￿ and
￿ to get
any more information for
￿. Totally, Bob has
two equations about
￿
￿ . However, for
￿ itself,
he effectively has one equation, as many as
Alice has for his vector.
4.3 Stability considerations
Besides the security and efﬁciency of the scheme,
we need to ensure that the error introduced by the extra
computations does not affect the accuracy of the result.
One can avoid such errors by extending the precision,
however, this introduces extra overhead. We present ex-
perimentaldata suggesting that the accuracyof the com-
putation is similar to that of computing an un-secured
dot-product without extended precision.
5 Experimental results
As we have indicated earlier, we are interested in two
aspects of the protocol behavior: the overhead it intro-
duces and its numerical stability.
￿ Overhead. There are two types of overhead in-
volved in the protocol. The communication over-
head is the amount of extra data that needs to be
communicated, compared to the simple protocol.
The computation overhead refers to the extra com-
putation performed. We note that both of these
overheads depend on the security parameter
￿. The
computation overhead has a quadratic dependence
on it, while the communication overhead is only
linearly dependent. All measurements presented in
this section correspond to
￿
￿
￿. We believe that
even for this low value of the security parameter,
there is a sufﬁcient measure of security provided
by the protocol.
– Communication. Bob must send four vec-
tors to Alice. Two further rounds of commu-
nication are needed, involving in total three
scalars.
– Computation. One of the features of our pro-
tocol is that a large part of the data can be
reused when the same vector is repeatedly
used in different dot-product computations.
More speciﬁcally, if Alice and Bob have en-
gaged in an execution of the protocol and
they want to execute the protocol again with
only Alice changing her vector, Bob needs
to change only
￿,
￿
￿,
￿
￿,
￿
￿ and, conse-
quently,
￿
￿and
￿.
￿
￿
￿ and
￿ can remain
the same without compromising the security
of his vector. This means that the majority of
the computation overhead can be amortized
over a large number of executions.
– Total overhead. The protocol was imple-
mented on two PIII/450MHz machines con-
nected over a Gigabit ethernet. The messag-
ing API was MPI. All the measurementswere
taken over the entire protocol, without any
amortization. We used randomly instantiated,
normalized vectors of length
￿
￿
￿. For the
generation of random numbers, we used the
standard C-library drand48 pseudo-random
number generator. The overhead in this case
is observed to be
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿, on average. We
observe that in spite of the relatively fast net-
work,communicationoverheaddominatesto-
tal overhead. One can expect this effect to be
even more pronounced for slower networks.
The use of more sophisticated means for ob-
taining random numbers should not have sig-
niﬁcant impact on the above overhead.
￿ Numerical stability. The average relative error over
a large number of random (normal) vectors was
measuredto be
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿. Given that the relative
error of the normal computation of the dot-product
is of the same order, the results can be considered
absolutely satisfactory.
6 Concluding Remarks and Ongoing Re-
search
In this paper, we have presented a secure protocol
for computing dot-products. We have demonstrated an-
alytically as well as experimentally the excellent perfor-
mance characteristics, numerical stability, and security
properties of the protocol. Compared to conventional
cryptographictechniques,thislinearalgebraictechnique
has much lower overhead.
Ongoingworkinourgroupfocusesondevelopingse-
curecomputationtechniquesfora varietyofproblemsin
data mining and analysis. Data mining poses the prob-
lem of computing the dot-product between two binary
vectors, efﬁciently and securely. The challenge in this
case is to avoid the extensive use of number theoretic
techniques. Two variations of the problem come from
the dot-product between sparse vectors (the difﬁculty
arising from the need to hide which positions are im-
portant while not wanting to traverse all of them) and
5the threshold variation of the problem, where we want
to know whether the product exceeds a speciﬁed thresh-
old but nothing more.
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